UNCLASSIFIED// ROUTINE R 021911Z SEP 20 MID200000067445U FM CNO WASHINGTON DC TO NAVADMIN CMC WASHINGTON DC INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC BT UNCLAS NAVADMIN 243/20 PASS TO OFFICE CODES: FM CNO WASHINGTON DC/N2N6// INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC//N2N6// MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N2N6/SEP// SUBJ/U.S. NAVY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF NAVY COMMANDS, FLEETS, AND BASES, STATIONS AND INSTALLATIONS// REF/A/DOC/ONI/FITDON/2019// REF/B/DOC/US CODE TITLE 50/2011// REF/C/DOC/EO 12333/2008// REF/D/DOC/SECNAV/SECNAVINST 3850.2E/2017// REF/E/DOC/USDI/DODD 5240.02/2015// REF/F/DOC/SECNAV/SECNAVINST 5430.107A/2019// REF/G/DOC/CNO/OPNAVINST 5450.353A/2019// REF/H/DOC/CJCS/CJCSI 3241.01A/2013// REF/I/DOC/USDI/DODI 5240.10/2020// REF/J/DOC/USDI/S-DODI 5240.17/2014// NARR/REF A IS THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT TO DEPARTMENT OF NAVY (FIT DON) ANNUAL PUBLICATION. REF B IS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 50 WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. REF C IS AN EXECUTIVE ORDER GOVERNING UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. REF D IS SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION ON DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WHICH PROVIDES POLICY AND DEFINES SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE NAVY. REF E IS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, WHICH PROVIDES POLICY AND ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONDUCTING CI ACTIVITIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. REF F IS SECRETARY OF THE NAVY INSTRUCTION ON THE MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE. REF G IS THE NAVY INSTRUCTION ON THE MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND TASKS OF THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY. REF H IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. REF I IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION ON THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE DOD COMPONENTS. REF J IS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSTRUCTION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES.// RMKS/1. Per reference (a), the U.S. Navy is a key target for Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIEs) collection efforts to steal our significant technical advantage over our competitors and degrade our strategic lethal overmatch of our adversaries. DON counterintelligence (CI) components (U.S. Navy CI, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) CI and Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS)) and the Intelligence Community (IC) conduct CI activities to identify FIE efforts to target sensitive and classified information pertaining to Department of the Navy (DON) technology, plans, order of battle, capabilities, and intentions. 2. Authority. Per references (b) through (d), the commanders and heads of the intelligence and CI elements of the Navy will: (1) collect (including through clandestine means), produce, analyze and disseminate defense and defense-related intelligence and CI to support departmental requirements, and, as appropriate, national requirements; (2) conduct CI activities; (3) monitor the development, procurement and management of intelligence systems and equipment; and (4) conduct military intelligence liaison relationships. Specifically, Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) has authorized Navy CI personnel to conduct authorized CI activities on behalf of the command to which they are assigned under the authority, direction, and control of the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Activities include: CI Analysis and Production (CI A&P), CI Collection Activities (CCA), CI Functional Services (CIFS), and support to NCIS CI Investigations and NCIS Advanced Offensive CI Operations (OFCO). 3. Responsibility and Tasks. Per references (d) and (e), CI activities will be undertaken as part of an integrated DOD and national effort. The Navy will integrate CI activities into all operations, programs, systems, exercises, plans, doctrine, strategies, policies, and architectures to detect, identify, assess, exploit, and deny FIE and their insiders targeting or exploiting DON information, personnel, operations and other activities. Navy CI elements will conduct CI A&P; CIFS; CCA; and support to NCIS Advanced CI Operations and NCIS CI Investigations. Per references (d) and (f), NCIS is identified as the Military Department Counterintelligence Organization (MDCO) and in that role, they are the sole DON CI component authorized to conduct CI Investigations of DON personnel. 4. Coordination. Per reference (g), the Naval Intelligence Activity (NIA) serves as the Executive Agent and Functional Manager for Navy CI and Human Intelligence (HUMINT). The Navy CI Coordinating Authority (NCICA) under the authority, direction, and control of the DNI will coordinate, deconflict and synchronize CI activities executed by U.S. Navy CI personnel or on behalf of the Service. Per reference (h), if expressly stated in a Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approved plan or order, the Combatant Commander assumes and exercises Operational Control over CI forces assigned or attached. Where there is no SECDEF approved plan or order being executed, CI elements and activities remain under the command and control of the Service. In all instances, both the U.S. Navy CICA and the affected Combatant Command CICA should be part of the coordination, deconfliction and synchronization of Service CI activities. All U.S. Navy CI Inquiries, also called CI Incident Assessments (CIIAs), will be coordinated and deconflicted with NCIS before initiating to determine the MDCO level of interest in opening an investigation on the basis of the initial information. If there is insufficient grounds to open an investigation, a CI Inquiry will be initiated to determine if there is a foreign nexus. If during the conduct of the CI Inquiry information of a criminal nature is discovered, the CI Inquiry will be halted and the information immediately provided to NCIS. All information identified during the conduct of U.S. Navy CI activities found to be of an investigative nature will be passed to NCIS via the Secret Intranet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center (SCLEOC). 5. CI Support. All Navy CI support activities in support of Navy commands will be conducted as per reference (d) and coordinated through the NCICA. Requests for CI support should be coordinated with Fleet N2X components and concerned organization Commanders to ensure the capability is employed under the appropriate command and CI authorities. Due to the dynamic nature of CI activities, requests for CI support will require NIA validation. Support requests will not be used as augmentation for Maritime Operations Centers or Maritime Intelligence Operations Centers, numbered Fleet staffs or to off-set/compensate for permanently assigned personnel, individual augmentation shortfalls, or Global Force Management Request for Forces. 6. CI Analysis and Production (CI A&P). The U.S. Navy will develop analytic products to address the threat posed by espionage, international terrorism, subversion, sabotage, assassination, and covert activities. This includes other activities that have a FIE nexus. CI analysis enhances the understanding of the intentions of an FIE, foreign security service, an international terrorist entity, or other foreign actors and provides indications of their limitations, plans, and warning intentions. CI A&P also supports other CI functions of CIFS, CCA, CI Investigations and CI as well as support to U.S. Navy foreign intelligence activities. This includes, but is not limited to, analysis for offensive CI operations, investigative lead development, threats to personnel and property, threats to the security of DON forces and operations, and foreign intelligence collection against DoD technology, information systems, and infrastructure. 7. CI Functional Services (CIFS). CIFS are CI activities conducted to support the four DOD CI missions and that enable one or more of the other CI functions. Per reference (i), CIFS include, but are not limited to: (1) CI Awareness and Reporting briefings; (2) support to arms control and other international treaties; (3) support to antiterrorism and force protection; (4) support to military operations and training exercises; (5) support to war planning; (6) support to foreign visitor programs; (7) CI inquiries (also known as CIIAs); (8) liaison and collection activities not associated with CCA; (9) CI training; (10) CI surveillance and surveillance detection; (11) CI insider threat identification and mitigation efforts; (12) CI support to OPSEC programs; (13) CI support to HUMINT collection, asset validation, and enabling activities; (14) CI support to research, development, and acquisition to include support to Supply Chain Risk Management; (15) CI support to counter-proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction; (16) CI support to critical infrastructure protection; (17) CI support to security programs; (18) CI support to the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest Program; (19) CI support to foreign award nominations; (20) CI support in the screening of contract linguist personnel, and local national personnel hired by DoD in overseas locations; and (21) CI support to cyber operations. Specialized technical CIFS of Polygraph and credibility assessment support, and Technical Surveillance Countermeasures can only be conducted by NCIS. Route requests for specialized technical CIFS support with local NCIS Field Office and coordinate through NCICA. 8. CI Collection Activities (CCA). U.S. Navy CI elements conduct CCA to acquire information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of FIE and their insiders who engage in espionage, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, and clandestine intelligence activities directed against the United States, DOD and the DON. Per reference (j), CCA includes Military CI Collection, CI Questioning of Enemy Prisoners of War and Detainees, CI Debriefs, CI Liaison, Open Source and Media Exploitation, and CI Collection in Cyberspace. 9. The U.S. Navy executes CI as a Service responsibility and a function of command, not unlike Operational Security (OPSEC) or force protection. Navy CI Agents are a force multiplier for the DON, working closely with Marine Corps CI Agents, and freeing up NCIS limited assets to focus on executing advanced CI Operations and CI Investigations for which NCIS has unique authorities and placement to perform. 10. Released by VADM Jeffrey E. Trussler, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, OPNAV N2N6.// BT #0001 NNNN UNCLASSIFIED//