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NAVADMIN 075/25

SUBJ/NAVY GUIDANCE ON ENSURING APPROPRIATE USE OF THE DEFENSE BACKGROUND
INVESTIGATION PROCESS AND PURSUING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE NAVY'S
PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM//

REF/A/DOC/DUSN MEMO/21MAY2024//
REF/B/DOC/DUSN MEMO/08JAN2024//
REF/C/DOC/DUSN MEMO/DRAFT/04FEB25//
REF/D/MSG/ALNAV 085-23/23OCT2023//
REF/E/DOC/OSD/26MAR2024//
REF/F/DOC/OUUSD MEMO/18AUG2020//
REF/G/DOC/SECNAVINST 5510.30C/24JAN2020//
REF/H/DOC/DODM 5200.02/29OCT2020//
REF/I/MSG/NAVADMIN 120-24/14JUN24//
REF/J/DOC/SEAD 7/09NOV2018//

NARR/REF A IS THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (DON) GUIDANCE ON USE OF THE
PERSONNEL VETTING SYSTEM OF RECORD.
REF B IS THE DON GUIDANCE ON CONTINUOUS VETTING AND OTHER MEASURES TO
EXPEDITE REFORM AND TRANSITION TO TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0.
REF C IS THE DON GUIDANCE ON ENSURING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PERSONNEL
SECURITY PROGRAM (DRAFT) .
REF D IS THE UPDATE TO THE DON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM.
REF E IS THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT PROGRAM
UPDATED GUIDANCE.
REF F IS ADJUDICATING NON-UNITED STATES CITIZENS FOR ELIGIBILITY TO OCCUPY
NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS.
REF G IS THE DON PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM.
REF H IS THE PROCEDURES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) PERSONNEL
SECURITY PROGRAM.
REF I IS THE U.S. NAVY DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY
REQUIREMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE AND NON-INTELLIGENCE SECURITY MISSIONS.
REF J IS THE RECIPROCITY OF BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
ADJUDICATIONS.

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RMKS/1. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare (OPNAV
N2N6) manages and administratively oversees Security Management Office (SMO)
affiliation and Defense Information System for Security (DISS) accountability
for all Navy personnel and security records.

2. This NAVADMIN serves as direction to all Navy Activity Security Managers
(ASMs) and Special Security Officers (SSOs) to ensure the Navy's Personnel

Security Investigations (PSIs) are managed per appropriate policy, funds are utilized responsibly, and that financial integrity and accountability are maintained. Per reference (b), individuals occupying sensitive positions or maintaining access to classified information, after a successful initial background investigation (BI), must be enrolled in continuous vetting (CV). Per reference (a), Periodic Reinvestigations (PR) initiated on CV-enrolled personnel represent an unauthorized expense to the DON and the Navy. Upon completion of the initial BI and enrollment in CV, subsequent BI initiations by Navy ASMs and SSOs are not authorized per existing DON Policy. Exceptional circumstances are identified in paragraph 3.c.

3. Periodic Reinvestigations

a. Per reference (a), ASMs and SSOs are prohibited from initiating Tier 3 Reinvestigations (T3R) or Tier 5 Reinvestigations (T5R) for individuals currently enrolled in CV.

(1) If an individual is eligible to be enrolled in CV but has not been enrolled, the command or activity with security cognizance must initiate an initial CV enrollment. PRs may not be requested or authorized on any individual who meets CV enrollment criteria per references (b) and (c).

(2) Requesting a PR "in lieu of CV enrollment" is not authorized.

(3) Requesting a PR "to bring the last BI into scope" is not authorized.

b. PRs are no longer authorized for personnel in the Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) or Presidential Support Program (PSP) per references (d) and (e). Questions regarding the PRP should be referred to Strategic Systems Program (SSP) managers. Questions regarding the PSP should be referred to the DON's White House Liaison Office.

c. PRs are only authorized for the following exceptional circumstances for individuals who cannot be enrolled in CV:

(1) The individual is a foreign national occupying a sensitive position per reference (f).

(2) The individual maintains a Limited Access Authorization (LAA) granted and maintained per references (g) and (h).

(3) The individual is a contractor occupying a sensitive position who does not maintain an existing national security eligibility listed in DISS.

(a) These individuals are referred to as non-National Industrial Security Program (NISP) contractors. Their DISS profile generally reflects a favorable adjudication with an eligibility of "NONE" based on a Tier 3 (T3) or Tier 5 (T5) initial background investigation or its equivalent.

(b) Reinvestigations are not authorized for contractors maintaining an existing national security eligibility.

d. The National Background Investigation Services (NBIS) Electronic Application (eApp) contains several prompts which recommend a full BI when derogatory or adverse information is identified in the Personnel Vetting Questionnaire (PVQ) for initial and updated CV enrollments. ASMs and SSOs are required to ignore prompts to initiate an investigation in NBIS and follow instructions in reference (a) to continue enrollment or reenrollment in CV.

e. ASMs and SSOs who have authorized a PR in error must contact the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) telephone liaison immediately to request a case cancellation or a rejection of the submitted eApp. This will allow the DON to recoup the cost of the unnecessary BI. DUSN I&S receives the recouped money and reallocates it to other critical PV funding requirements for the DON. Navy monitors DISS records and the associated Navy commands for unauthorized or cancelled BIs.

4. Continuous Vetting Subscriptions

a. On 1 October 2023, DCSA began leveraging a subscription-based billing model for CV. DCSA bills the DON monthly for maintaining enrollment in the CV program. The DON is billed for the subscription as long as an individual maintains an affiliation with a Navy command in DISS or its successor system.

b. To ensure that the DON is only paying subscriptions for personnel who are affiliated with the Navy, ASMs and SSOs must ensure that command owning and servicing relationships in DISS, or its successor system, are accurate and that individuals no longer employed by the Navy have their owning or servicing relationships removed in the system immediately upon departure, per reference (i).

5. Initial Background Investigations

a. ASMs and SSOs must conduct a Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) search in the Joint Verification System (JVS) prior to initiating an initial BI to ensure reciprocity or transfer of trust is appropriately applied. Validating investigative needs through the SII reduces duplicative costs associated with unnecessary background investigations when an already existing background investigation was conducted external to the DoD, per reference (j).

b. In circumstances where an individual resigns, retires, is separated from employment, or expresses a desire for removal from the hiring process while undergoing a BI, the ASM or SSO is required to cancel the scheduled investigation upon that individual's departure. This will allow the DON to receive a billing credit associated with the portions of the BI that were not completed. ASMs and SSOs should contact the DCSA telephone liaison for investigation cancellation instructions.

c. To reduce costs associated with unnecessary BIs, ASMs and SSOs will only request investigations that correlate to an individual's position sensitivity. Personnel will not be vetted beyond the requirements determined by the position description (PD) or orders.

(1) In circumstances where an individual transfers from a higher sensitivity national security position designation to a lower one; the cognizant command should retain the individual's heightened eligibility for cost and efficiency purposes but must ensure that job duties and accesses are commensurate with the reduced position sensitivity.

(2) In circumstances where an individual has heightened access needs or has been reassigned to a higher sensitivity billet, the associated PD must be updated accordingly.

6. Monitoring Costs. ODUSN (I&S) Personnel Vetting Division is closely monitoring charges to the PSI budget. Excessive or unauthorized expenses will be brought to the attention of OPNAV N2N6, collateral security managers and command leadership; any unnecessary vetting activities will be cancelled or rejected.

7. This NAVADMIN message will remain in effect until canceled or superseded.

8. Released by VADM Karl O. Thomas, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, OPNAV N2N6.//

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